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8 What kind of dialogue do we need?
Gender, deliberation and
comprehensive values
C L A R E CHAMB E R S AND PH I L P A R V I N
Recent branches of political theory, including feminism, communitari-
anism, identity theory and difference theory, have criticised liberalism
and liberal democratic politics for failing to recognise the importance
of group diversity and identity. In response, political and democratic
theorists have increasingly appealed to public deliberation as a means
of resolving political questions. Deliberative democrats, for example,
have sought to move beyond traditional understandings of democracy
as a merely representative system by recasting it as a regime in which
individual citizens determine policy outcomes and political decisions
through their active participation in public dialogue with one another.
Many liberals, meanwhile, have increasingly sought to ground liberal
principles in agreements struck between participants in some form of
deliberative process. That is, having taken on board claims about the
importance of difference and identity to the ways in which people
think and the values they hold, many liberal political theorists have
felt the need to retreat from controversial commitments to substantive
principles such as autonomy, and have instead grounded their theories
in a more general commitment to public dialogue.1 Where liberalism
was generally seen as either a perfectionist theory which stipulated
the supremacy of certain values over others or a contractualist theory
premised upon some appropriately modelled agreement between indi-
viduals bound by common standards of rationality, it is now increas-
ingly seen as a deliberative theory rooted in inclusive dialogue among
situated individuals. In making the transition from contractualism to
The authors would like to thank the members of the Nuffield Political Theory
Workshop and Zofia Stemplowska for their helpful comments.
1 See, for example, John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1991); Martha Nussbaum, A Plea for Complexity, in
Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard and Martha Nussbaum, eds., Is
Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton University Press, 1999).
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deliberation, many liberals feel that they have developed a more effective
way of justifying liberal principles in circumstances of diversity, by fore-
grounding inclusive, collective dialogue over hypothetical contracts
and agreement models which require everyone to act and think in the
same way.
In this chapter, we explore in more detail the deliberative turn in
contemporary political theory with a view to questioning the contribu-
tion that dialogue and public deliberation make to our understanding
of liberalism or democracy. Our claim is that a focus on gender as a
source of controversy, and on feminism as a theoretical and practical
approach, prompts a rethinking of the role of dialogue away from the
liberal constitutionalist focus common among many liberals and delib-
erative democrats and towards a more fluid, reflexive approach.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section we attempt to
show that the concept of dialogue in fact does very little work in
deliberative democracy or political liberalism at the fundamental
moral or ethical level, and that the claims made by many supporters
of political liberalism and deliberative democracy about their ability
to provide an inclusive, difference-sensitive forum in which to derive
regulative principles for our ethical and political life are overstated.
Political deliberation of the kind found in deliberative democracy and
political liberalism, we suggest, is best applied to questions of practical
policy once foundational ethical principles are agreed upon (although
even there we have some scepticism about the potential for consensus).
Furthermore, we claim in the second section that deliberation is parti-
cularly ill suited to reconciling controversies concerning gender, since
many of the most pressing questions in gender ethics are themselves
controversies concerning foundational principles rather than practical
policy. In the third section, we go on to show that, while the deliberative
democratic model may not represent an effective means of deriving
the kind of overarching ethical and political rules that many of its
advocates believe it can, there nevertheless is a role for the transfor-
mative power of dialogue in the context of gender ethics. We appeal to
John Dryzek’s distinction between discursive and deliberative demo-
cracy, and argue that the discursive model is redolent of feminist
accounts of consciousness-raising. Despite Dryzek’s scepticism and
the general falling from favour of consciousness-raising, we suggest
that advocates of deliberation and dialogue should take it seriously
once again.
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1 The role of dialogue and the deliberative turn
The emphasis on dialogue characteristic of deliberative democracy and
political liberalism has many advantages, according to its supporters.
The process of deliberation, with its gathering of ideas and development
of argument, enables better decisions to bemade thanwould result from
mere preference aggregation or contracts. The deliberative model of
liberalism provides a more coherent foundation for liberal principles.
Dialogue builds greater understanding between people with different
backgrounds and beliefs, and this greater understanding can in turn
increase stability and solidarity. Similarly, the deliberative democratic
model better fulfils the aims of democracy by encouraging greater parti-
cipation among the citizen body and, consequently, producing outcomes
and decisions rooted in the experiences, interests and concerns of
those involved. Participation in democratic debates may also be good
for people considered individually, by educating them and honing their
intellectual and empathetic faculties.
Before we consider deliberative democracy in more detail, let us first
look in more depth at the claims made by political liberals. Conventional
liberal accounts of justice and political reasoning have attracted signifi-
cant criticism in recent years for their perceived inability to take seriously
the complex needs and concerns of different groups and individuals
which populate liberal democratic states.2 Liberals have commonly
argued that, in striving to secure basic freedoms for all members of the
polity regardless of their gender or their social or cultural circumstances,
liberalism is able to transcend these differences and establish a moral
community regulated by principles of equality and freedom which are
rationally defensible to all. Critics, on the other hand, have claimed
that liberals lean too heavily on a controversial Enlightenment account
of the individual as shorn of those attachments that confer identity,
2 See, e.g., the communitarian critiques of Michael Walzer and Michael Sandel; the
multicultural critiques of Will Kymlicka and Joseph Raz; and critiques by
difference-theorists such as Iris Marion Young. Michael Walzer, Spheres of
Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983);
Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge University
Press, 1982); Will Kymlicka,Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of
Minority Rights (Oxford University Press, 1995); Joseph Raz,Multiculturalism: A
Liberal Perspective, in Ethics on the Public Domain (Oxford University Press,
1994), pp. 170–91; IrisM. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton
University Press, 1990).
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affiliations and memberships which enable the individual to deliberate
and act meaningfully in the world.3 Contrary to what liberals might
claim, critics have said, liberal societies are not populated by ‘individuals’
who think and deliberate and communicate in the sameway; rather, they
are populated by men, women, Muslims, Jews, gays, lesbians, wives,
sons, academics, professionals and so on – a complex multitude whose
personal beliefs and understandings are shaped by themany overlapping
and conflicting communities and circumstances which make them the
people they are.
Diversity therefore represents both a philosophical and a political
challenge. It is a brute fact of political life that liberal democratic societies
are more culturally, ethnically and religiously diverse than they once
were. People across the world are more mobile, often pursuing oppor-
tunities and markets created by a globalising economy. Borders are
more fluid, and labour markets more changeable than they used to be.
According to the last British census, 12 per cent of full-time students aged
16–25 in Britain are now from Asian and black communities. One in ten
schoolchildren do not have English as their first language. Britain is now
home to over a million Muslims, half a million Hindus and a quarter of
a million Jews. ‘New world’ nation-states like the USA and Canada are
even more diverse, with immigrant minorities and first-nation peoples
seeking fair representation from their democratic institutions and repre-
sentatives.4 The pressure that such diversity exerts on democratic insti-
tutions and mechanisms is considerable.
The empirical fact of diversity has always exercised political philoso-
phers, and liberal political theorists in particular. After all, John Rawls’
justice as fairness began with the assumption that liberal societies are
characterised by a basic ‘fact of pluralism’, and liberal political thinkers
since John Locke have been deeply interested in the question of how best
to establish norms of toleration and freedom so that the different ways of
3 See, e.g., Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers, vol. II, Philosophy and the Human
Sciences (Cambridge University Press, 1985); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A
Study in Moral Theory, 2nd edn (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1984), and Alasdair MacIntyre,Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).
4 See Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and
Citizenship (Oxford University Press, 2001) and Will Kymlicka, Finding Our
Way: Re-Thinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Oxford University Press,
1998).
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life which exist in democratic societies at any one time might flourish
alongside one another.5 But whilst Locke sought the peaceful coexistence
of Protestantism and Catholicism, contemporary liberal theorists have
sought to contend with a much more radical multiplicity of views and
ways of life. Many, including John Rawls, Martha Nussbaum, Charles
Larmore andMonique Deveaux, have done so by positing an account of
dialogue capable of producing agreements between diverse persons on
regulative principles.6
Let us focus for now on the political liberalism of Charles Larmore,
an early influential exponent of the deliberative turn in liberal political
theory. Larmore begins with the familiar liberal claim that the world is
characterised by reasonable disagreement about the content of the good
life, about the ends to which our lives should be directed, and about
the way in which we relate to our most deeply held values, beliefs and
self-understandings. Indeed, he says, contemporary liberal democratic
states are characterised by a diversity not only of ideas and attitudes
concerning our political obligations to one another, but also of the more
fundamental, ‘deep features of morality’ which shape and animate our
political beliefs.7 Consequently, he argues, a coherent conception of
political justice needs to acknowledge this moral diversity and be capa-
ble of resolving the conflicts which arise out of it. Traditional forms of
liberalism premised upon the prioritisation of substantive principles,
such as autonomy and individuality, are incapable of doing this: rather
than resolve conflicts between diverse principles and ideas about the
good, liberalism has become ‘simply another part of the problem’.8
What liberalism must do, therefore, is avoid any commitment to such
controversial principles in favour of establishing a stable accommodation
of divergent (yet reasonable) conceptions of the good life. Thick founda-
tions must be rejected in favour of a thin commitment to the idea that all
5 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1971); John Locke,
Two Treatises of Government (1690), in The Two Treatises of Government, ed.
P. Laslett (Cambridge University Press, 1998); and John Locke, A Letter
Concerning Toleration (1689), in A Letter Concerning Toleration in Focus, ed.
S. Mendus and J. Horton (London: Routledge, 1991).
6 Rawls, Political Liberalism; Nussbaum, Plea for Complexity; Charles Larmore,
Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge University Press, 1987), and
Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge University Press, 1996);
Monique Deveaux, Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2000).
7 Larmore,Morals of Modernity, p. 170. 8 Ibid., p. 131.
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persons deserve equal respect. For Larmore, justice is only truly served
when persons are freed from the imposition of having to understand
themselves in a particular way and are able to engage in meaningful and
inclusive dialogue about the content of those principles which regulate
and underpin the state and their wider ethical life, without first having to
commit themselves to controversial principles like individual autonomy.
However, Larmore’s conception of liberalism and political dialogue is
more controversial than he believes. For example, he admits that his
theory can be applicable only to a person who ‘accepts the norms of
rational dialogue and equal respect, and accords them supreme impor-
tance’ and goes on to state that ‘those who reject the norm of equal
respect or rank their view of the good life above it . . . will usually be
unable to converge on any political (coercive) principles’.9 In this regard,
he says, ‘there is a limit to the rational transparency liberalism can hope
for in its political principles. The public justification a liberal polity offers
for its principles must presume that citizens share a form of life that
embodies a commitment to equal respect.’10 Also, he states, his argument
for liberal neutrality ‘applies only to peoplewho are interested in devising
principles of political association. It assumes that they share enough to
think of themselves as engaged in this common enterprise . . . In short,’ he
goes on,
the people to whom this argument for liberal neutrality applies must already
think of themselves as ‘a people’ or ‘a nation’. They must have a common life
before they can think of organising their political life according to liberal
principles . . . without a common life the disagreements [born out of moral
pluralism] would give ample grounds for the individuals to disband or to
switch their allegiances elsewhere.11
Taken together, then, the constraints Larmore imposes on public
dialogues about justice and regulative political principles seem to rely
upon the acceptance of two closely interwoven arguments which we
find shared by a great many liberals writing from both the deliberative
and contractualist traditions. The first is an ‘information’ argument,
whereby individuals are expected to endorse neutrality as a result of
what they know about themselves (that is, that they are a member of
a nation or people pursuing some form of common life and that they
are able to value the norms of equal respect and rational dialogue
9 Ibid., p. 142; emphasis added. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid., pp. 142–3.
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higher than any other aims they might have). The second, however, is a
‘motivational’ argument which presupposes that persons will strive to
overcome their disagreements about the good life in the hope that they
will, in doing so, establish a social and political arrangement which
allows them to pursue their more substantive conceptions of the good
as fully as possible within an inclusive public sphere. These two argu-
ments, though formally distinct, can be seen to be mutually dependent.
It is conceived to be the agent’s knowledge of herself (as a participant in
a common non-political life and a possessor of certain beliefs and ends
which she has an interest in pursuing) that leads her to engage in rational
dialogue with others about how to go about organising the political
institutions of the state. And, conversely, it is the desire (or motivation)
to establish an inclusive and fair system of government (which will
allow her to pursue her ends and practise her beliefs as fully as possible
within the boundaries set by principles which are derived from rational
agreements) which provokes her to temper her demands in order to
satisfy the principle of equal respect and sustain meaningful dialogue in
the face of disagreement about the good life. That is, it is the desire for
agreement which leads participants in the dialogue to set aside their
more controversial beliefs about the good life in order that rational
dialogue does not merely break down in the face of insurmountable
and incommensurable disagreement. To this end, the ‘information’ and
‘motivation’ arguments converge to provide an account of why persons
would adopt a ‘reasonable’ position with regard to others, rather than
merely one of domination or dogmatism.
Like many writing in the liberal tradition, then, Larmore’s theory
begins with the claim that contemporary liberal societies are characte-
rised by moral and political diversity and that therefore the principles
which regulate it must be uncontroversial enough to be accepted by all
those involved, regardless of their various commitments, beliefs, ideals
and memberships. However, he goes on to define the situation in which
these principles are derived as characterised by a series of very contro-
versial claims indeed. For example, Larmore’s claims about reasonable-
ness, equal respect and the necessary commitment among all people
to rational dialogue suggests that all individual persons (rather than
groups or representatives or village elders or whatever) ‘must be free to
explain to one another in full their comprehensive visions of the good
life’which are their own andwhich cannot be simply subsumedwithin –
or identified with – the particular culture or community to which they
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belong.12 Individual people have their own understandings of their own
commitments and beliefs, weighed and interpreted in relation to their
own lived experiences and circumstances. Consequently, the norms of
equal respect and rational dialogue would appear to suggest that all
individuals from all communities should be understood as possessing
the social, political and intellectual resources they need to participate in
public, political discourse on an equal basis with others regardless of the
particular values or desires which prevail in the many social, cultural,
religious or other groups to which they belong. That is, Larmore’s
claims suggest that dialogue must be not merely among those members
of a community who are thought to be in charge or in the ascendant
majority, but also among those members who have previously been
excluded from such participation (either in the derivation of public
principles of justice or constitutional rules or in the formation or inter-
pretation of norms within the group itself). Larmore’s theory therefore
makes important claims about who should have the opportunity to be
involved in political dialogue (and hence, to whom political principles
should be justified) and it presupposes that participants will be capable
of deliberating in the way he requires. This raises important questions
about the interrelationship between our ‘political’ lives and our ‘non-
political’ lives, a point which has been made forcefully by feminists. The
commitment to the political equality of all individuals to enter into dia-
logue, regardless of what elites within cultural or religious groups might
say, for example, and the idea that all persons possess an equal normative
status independent of the particular group to which they belong (as
demanded by the norm of equal respect) require that persons are actually
enabled to conceive themselves in a way that renders these equalities (and
the benefits they generate) accessible and intelligible to them.
We can see this most clearly, perhaps, if we descend from the level of
abstract theory for amoment (as many advocates of deliberative democ-
racy and public dialogue ask us to do), in order to consider some of the
ways in which social and political movements have actually sought to
affect and shape the conduct of political discourse in western liberal
democracies. The history of these societies is at least partly characte-
rised by internal struggles for recognition and equality by those who
were previously systematically excluded from participating in their own
political structures. The struggle for equal civil rights by women and
12 Ibid., p. 135.
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ethnic minorities, for example, represents an overwhelming desire by
those groups to secure both the basic political conditions that they need
in order to participate in the constitution of their political and social
structures on an equal basis with others and also, we might say, the
basic conditions that characterise the lives of these people in private
which make these political freedoms accessible to them. Hence, calls for
universal suffrage have often gone hand in hand with calls for greater
representation of marginalised groups in decision-making bodies and
institutions and for a widening and improvement of education such that
people from groups who have been excluded from political decision
making and democratic debates (and, perhaps, from education) in the
past can make meaningful and informed decisions about the ways in
which their political institutions might be structured, how their interests
might best be represented and what kind of lives they want to lead.
For example, as Anne Phillips has pointed out, the women’s move-
ment in Britain and the United States not only campaigned in favour of
strikes for equal pay and for better employment protection for part-time
women workers, but also sought to combat
misrepresentation of women in the media, the sexual harassment of women . . .
the bullying and violence of their husbands . . . [and] the patronage visited upon
women in political meetings and parties. Despite their formation of a counter-
cultural movement that despised the conventions of establishment politics,
feminists eventually turned their attention to women’s exclusion from the
conventional political arena . . . Where earlier generations had given the
impression that all was now fine on the political front . . . but pretty depressing
in social and economic life, contemporary feminists have argued that sexual
inequality pervades the very definitions and practices of politics as well as the
conditions of economic life.13
It is for precisely these reasons that many feminists have sought to radi-
cally reconstruct the way in which we understand, internalise and discuss
our most fundamental political, legal and economic concepts and ideals.
Deliberative democrats, too, look to dialogue as the means by which
political questions might be resolved, and they do so for reasons that
are connected with those offered by political liberals. Deliberative dem-
ocrats like Joshua Cohen, Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson and
Jürgen Habermas argue that traditional definitions of democracy are
13 Anne Phillips,Which Equalities Matter? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999)
pp. 21–2.
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insufficient in a world of increased diversity and declining civic and
political engagement.14 In a diverse society, marginal interests are
too often ignored or sidelined by majoritarian institutions, representa-
tive bodies or formal democratic procedures. Consequently, they argue,
democracy needs to be recast as a regime of institutions which encourage
and facilitate the widest possible engagement of citizens in democratic
debates. Policies, institutions and decisions about political matters
should be made by citizens themselves through collective dialogue.
Deliberative democracy is generally seen by its defenders, therefore, as
better able to secure political equality, individual freedom and the legiti-
macy of public institutions than more traditional accounts of democratic
politics. However, deliberative democrats disagree over the role of delib-
eration in stipulating the substantive principles which frame public
debates. Cohen, for example, argues that deliberative democracy should
be viewed as a procedural mechanism for deciding policies rather than
substantive principles. Gutmann and Thompson, on the other hand, are
among a group of deliberative democrats who believe that deliberation
should yield not only policy decisions but also substantive principles.
That is, parties to the deliberative process do not merely debate specific
matters of policy; they also debate the terms under which these debates
take place.
But again, deliberation cannot produce substantive principles pre-
cisely because these principles must exist prior to, and independently of,
the deliberative process. Cohen argues that any deliberative democratic
process must, if it is to be considered legitimate, be premised upon the
prior values of freedom, equality and individuality. Debates which are
not premised on those values are inconsistent with democracy, and so
their outcomes will be illegitimate. Gutmann and Thompson, on the
other hand, argue that the rules which govern democratic conversations
14 Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in The Good Polity
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy
and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998);
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,Why Deliberative Democracy?
(Princeton University Press, 2004); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,
Deliberative Democracy Beyond Process, Journal of Political Philosophy 10:2
(2002), pp. 153–77; Jürgen Habermas, Popular Sovereignty as Procedure, in
Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, ed. James Bohman and
William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 35–66. For more
detailed discussion of Habermas’s conception of deliberation, see Chapters 5 and
9 in this volume.
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are to be decided in those conversations. However, they also argue that
parties to democratic debates must be understood as free and equal
individuals, and that outcomes which violate such basic principles as
bodily integrity or the right to health care irrespective of age, race or
culture are impermissible.15 Gutmann, Thompson and Cohen, there-
fore, all share the claim that the process of public deliberation must
be circumscribed by prior values which are not themselves products
of the dialogue. The deliberative democratic model, like the political
liberalism of Rawls, Larmore and colleagues, presupposes that persons
are capable of entering into the kinds of dialogues that these theorists
envisage.
This is important because it raises a further question about the ability
of political liberalism to represent a more effective account of liberal
reasoning than any other – for example, contractualist – approaches,
especially regarding questions of gender inequality. Furthermore, it
raises questions about the ability of deliberative democracy to yield
substantive principles. One of the main differences between deliberative
democracy and political liberalism is, of course, that in political liber-
alism the deliberation described is hypothetical, much like the contracts
invoked by thinkers such as Brian Barry, T.M. Scanlon and Rawls.16
One appeal of the deliberative approach for its defenders is the fact
that it descends from the level of abstract philosophical reasoning and
presents instead an account of agreement between real people with real
beliefs, ideals and unique perspectives, which takes place ‘not only in the
private homes of citizens or the studies of philosophers but in public
political forums’.17 Deliberative democrats seek to cut through liberal
assumptions about common reasoning and abstract Archimedean points
and show instead that public deliberation among the citizens of a dem-
ocratic polity can provide outcomes consistent with liberal principles in
a way that does not presuppose the prior supremacy of these principles.
But this raises crucial questions for deliberative democracy and for the
dialogical model, for as soon as we shift from hypothetical agreements
between appropriately defined actors to actual agreements between real
individuals, we are forced to look carefully at the conditions which must
15 Gutmann and Thompson, Deliberative Democracy Beyond Process, p. 161.
16 Brian Barry, Treatise on Social Justice, vol. II, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford
University Press, 1996); Thomas Scanlon,What We Owe to One Another
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); Rawls, Theory of Justice.
17 Gutmann and Thompson, Deliberative Democracy Beyond Process, p. 157.
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exist in the real world in order for these agreements and dialogues to take
place. We must ask who should be involved, what resources and capaci-
ties people need in order to be involved, and how theymight be provided.
Feminism has demonstrated that our political and non-political lives
are fundamentally intertwined. Our capacity to contribute to political
debates is shaped by the circumstances which exist in our supposedly
non-political lives. Hence a commitment to open and inclusive political
dialogue requires that other general conditions are met. It requires,
for example, that women from all parts of society should have the
opportunity to be fully involved in political debates, including those
who belong to groups or communities in which such involvement is
forbidden. And it also requires that communities which seek to exclude
women from gaining the kind of education or civic attachments that
prepare them for meaningful participation in collective dialogues about
political matters, or which encourage women to think of themselves as
unequal or not worthy of participating in democratic debates, must be
reformed.
The principle of equal respect that we find in Larmore and other
liberals, like the commitment to freedom, equality and individuality that
we find among deliberative democrats, requires that all individuals are
capable of engaging in meaningful discourse concerning the legitimacy
of substantive, regulative principles of political association, and also
that these persons are capable of discussing and reflecting upon the
nature of their private beliefs and commitments on reasonable terms.
For liberal justice to be truly neutral in the way that political liberals
envisage, and for democratic institutions to be capable of producing fair
and inclusive outcomes in the ways envisaged by deliberative demo-
crats, the model of deliberation at their hearts must be rooted in the
capacity of all individuals to have the opportunity to participate equally
in both the derivation of political rules and principles and the interpre-
tation and revision of those practices and ways of life which constitute
their non-political lives. In other words, the norms characteristic of
political liberalism and deliberative democracy necessarily embody a
commitment to ensuring that all individuals, regardless of their partic-
ular religious or cultural beliefs, and regardless also of the prejudices or
discriminatory attitudes whichmight prevail in the community to which
they belong, are allowed to access political dialogue and are provided
with the resources they need in order to debate meaningfully about their
own ideas about value, the importance of their beliefs and experiences
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to them, and the extent to which these beliefs are of continued worth.
It contains within it, that is, an implicit commitment to individuality,
political equality and an ability to reflect upon one’s ends and values
that necessarily trumps the ideals and beliefs embodied in groups that
reject them.
Thus, if inclusive, democratic debates of the kind advocated by
Gutmann, Thompson and colleagues are to get off the ground, then they
must be premised upon the prior good of political equality and the
provision of those intellectual and civic goods to all individuals such
that they might engage meaningfully in deliberative reasoning with other
persons on an equal basis. And, as feminists have pointed out in the past,
the capacity for women and men to participate equally in the political
realm will be shaped and sometimes thwarted by prevailing non-political
conditions or norms which undermine equal citizenship or individual
freedom.
This point also holds for those non-liberal thinkers who foreground
the notion of inclusive democratic dialogue as a means of resolving
political disputes and configuring institutions. As other contributors to
this volume have pointed out (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 9), Iris Young
criticises liberalism for its tendency to ‘reduce difference to unity.’ Instead
of deriving some substantive account of justice which is capable of
regulating and ordering political conflicts, she argues, political theorists
should seek ways in which different people with different identities and
perspectives might collectively resolve political questions. ‘Members of
a polity’, she writes, ‘need not seek and arrive at agreement on a general
account of justice in order to argue productively about their problems
and come to morally legitimate resolutions’ to political questions.18 But
again, here we must ask what distinguishes a ‘morally legitimate’ reso-
lution frommerely a ‘resolution’. Young’s reply is that political outcomes
‘can only be considered morally legitimate . . . if those whomust abide by
or adjust to them have had a part in their formation’.19 Consequently,
then, whether or not a resolution to a political question or conflict is
‘morally legitimate’ depends, for Young, on the extent to which it was
arrived at through an inclusive and fair process of democratic dialogue
which is maintained and made effective by the fact that all individual
18 Iris M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2000)
p. 29.
19 Ibid., p. 53.
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participants are able to ‘explain their background experiences, interests,
or proposals in ways that others can understand’ and to ‘express reasons
for their claims in ways that others recognise could be accepted even if in
fact they disagreewith the claims and reasons’.20 But this sounds a lot like
the liberalism that she wants to reject.
For all the radical credentials backing up Young’s critique of libera-
lism, therefore, it would seem that her politics of difference in fact rests
upon the rather familiar claim that, in order for persons to resolve
questions in a morally legitimate way, they must be willing and able to
adopt a reasonable standpointwith regard to their own ends and commit-
ments, and to keep talking even when faced with apparently incommen-
surable disagreements. What Young seems to assume is that all persons
who are party to the dialogue will be reasonable in the sense that they are
willing and able to articulate, debate and justify their particular claims
and ends inways that others can accept andwill have an openmind about
the values and commitments of others.
Not only does the politics of difference seem to embody both the
agreementmotive and the reasonableness requirement that we found in
Larmore (and which is also found in contractualist liberals such as
Barry and Scanlon), it also fails to escape the central question of what
is to be done about groups and individuals whose non-political circum-
stances thwart their equal entry into democratic dialogues with others.
Even defenders of a politics of difference such as Young, who reject the
need for overarching accounts of justice for their tendency to ‘reduce
difference to unity’, are surely compelled to encourage those virtues
and understandings among all individuals which are compatible with
political equality at the expense of those which uphold unequal norms
that thwart or undermine the ability of some people (for example,
women) to participate in democratic dialogues on an equal basis with
other citizens.
It is the conclusion of this first section, then, that deliberative demo-
crats and political liberals share a common conception of, and faith in,
deliberation as a means of resolving political questions, and further-
more that this model of deliberation presupposes rather than produces
substantive regulative principles. The notion of public, inclusive dia-
logue occupies broadly the same role in the theories of political liberals
as do contracts or a commitment to substantive normative principles:
20 Ibid., p. 25.
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they represent a way of understanding the implications of certain prin-
ciples (that is, political equality and freedom) which are valued inde-
pendently of – and prior to – the dialogue itself. Indeed, it is crucial that
they are valued independently of the dialogue because they provide the
grounds on which the dialogue itself is constructed and regulated. Put
more generally, any normative strategy which aims to produce publicly
justifiable democratic institutions, or which seeks to resolve questions
of justice, via a process of public dialogue must provide an account of
dialogue framed and regulated by ‘democratic’ principles of freedom
and equality. Consequently, the argument for political liberalism or
deliberative democracy appears to be circular: outcomes produced by
dialogues which are themselves underwritten and regulated by demo-
cratic principles will be democratic ones. Rather than look to the
political liberal or deliberative democratic model to set our regulative
principles of justice, therefore, we should look to the ways in which
democratic dialogues might produce better policies within constraints
set by our prior commitment to democratic values, or to ways in which
dialogue might encourage transformative reflexivity. This is the real
strength in the dialogical model, as we will see.
2 Deliberation and gender
We have suggested that collective deliberation has often been proposed
as a way of taking into account diversity, particularly cultural diversity,
and have argued that it is problematic to attempt to use deliberation,
as political liberals and many deliberative democrats do, to determine
foundational questions in the context of pluralism. In this section, we
develop this point with specific regard to gender. Using the work of Seyla
Benhabib, a feminist who is committed to the use of dialogue to resolve
controversies of gender, we demonstrate that it is precisely those founda-
tional questions that dialogue cannot resolve which are most at stake.
Benhabib agrees that dialogue is particularly appropriate given the
facts of cultural diversity. Moreover, she notes that many of the most
contentious issues of multiculturalism are in fact issues of gender. Of
Bhikhu Parekh’s twelve cultural practices that most engender conflict,
Benhabib states, most concern gender (in)equality:
Of the twelve practices listed by Parekh, seven concern the status of women
in distinct cultural communities; two bear on dress codes pertaining to both
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sexes (the wearing of the turban and the hijab); two are about the lines separa-
ting private from public jurisdictional authority in the education of children;
and one each concerns dietary codes and funeral rites. How can we account for
the preponderance of cultural practices concerning the status of women, girls,
marriage, and sexuality that lead to intercultural conflict?21
Although, as James Gordon Finlayson details in Chapter 1 above,
Benhabib does not endorse the whole of Habermas’s original form of
discourse ethics, she nevertheless proposes a form of ‘discourse ethics’
as a solution to such conflict. Like many deliberative democrats broadly
construed, she combines the premise that agreement on a norm is
necessary for that norm to have validity with the stipulation that certain
predetermined ground rules must govern the process of deliberation.
Both principles are combined in her approval of Habermas’s statement
that ‘only those norms and institutional arrangements are valid which
can be agreed to by all under special argumentation situations named
discourses’:22 agreement is necessary, but only under specific, predeter-
mined conditions. Benhabib characterises discourse ethics as a ‘meta-
norm’ that should be used to test and validate other ‘more specific
norms’.23
This metanorm’s predetermined conditions of discourse require
further specification. Benhabib lists three such conditions, which, she
feels, render ‘pluralist structures . . . quite compatible with a universalist
deliberative democratic model’.24
i Egalitarian reciprocity. ‘Members of cultural, religious, linguistic
and other minorities must not, in virtue of their membership status,
be entitled to lesser degrees of civil, political, economic and cultural
rights than the majority.’25
ii Voluntary self-ascription. ‘An individual must not be automatically
assigned to a cultural, religious, or linguistic group by virtue of his or
her birth. An individual’s group membership must permit the most
extensive forms of self-ascription and self-identification possible . . .
21 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era
(Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 83–4. The practices that directly relate to
gender are female circumcision; polygamy; Muslim and arranged marriages;
marriages within prohibited degrees of relations; Muslim withdrawal of girls
from coeducational practices such as sports and swimming lessons; the Muslim
headscarf; and the general ‘subordinate status of women and all that entails’.
22 Ibid., p. 107. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid., p. 19. 25 Ibid.
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the state should not simply grant the right to define and control
membership to the group at the expense of the individual.’26
iii Freedom of exit and association, including the freedom to remain a
member of a group even when marrying outside of it.27
Underpinning these principles is a more general principle: that of indi-
vidual autonomy. ‘In discourse ethics’, Benhabib states, ‘autonomy is
seen as a moral as well as a political principle’.28
Building upon the claims we made about political liberals such as
Larmore, and deliberative democrats such as Gutmann and Young in
the previous section, it seems that these principles appear to constrain
not just the process of dialogue but also its conclusions. Freedom of exit
and association, for example, does not really make sense as a procedural
rule of deliberation and is better understood as a required protected
norm in society more generally – one of the ‘more specific norms’ that
was supposed to be derived from the discourse. However, this seems to
conflict with Benhabib’s statement that such norms are valid only if they
are agreed upon through argumentation. Moreover, all four principles
are, in themselves, exceedingly controversial. It is therefore unlikely that
diverse cultural groups would converge upon them through discourse
unless the constraints upon that discourse were exceedingly stringent.
(The possibility for agreement on these principles seems even less likely
when considering the international dialogue that is the focus of
Kimberley Hutchings’ chapter in this volume.) And such stringent con-
straints, in turn, are unlikely to be accepted by all as the ground rules
for dialogical exchange and thus are problematic as the underpinnings
of discourse. If such controversial principles may legitimately be stipu-
lated prior to dialogue, then there seems to be rather less work left for
dialogue to do.
Moreover, what wewish to emphasise here is that these four principles
are significantly content-laden; indeed, so much so that adherence to
them would in itself resolve many of the controversies of gender without
recourse to dialogue at all. Benhabib argues that discourse ethics empha-
sises ‘the resolution of multicultural dilemmas through processes of
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. These three principles are restated several times throughout the book.
28 Ibid., p. 114. Benhabib also makes this point when she describes principles 2 and
3 as being based on ‘the concept of persons as self-interpreting and self-defining
beings’ (p. 132).
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will- and opinion-formation in civil society’.29 However, discourse
ethics appears rather to resolve the key multicultural dilemmas of gender
merely by stating its founding principles.
Take, for example, one of Parekh’s gendered multicultural dilemmas:
female circumcision. When practised on children before the age of
consent, it directly violates Benhabib’s fundamental condition of volu-
ntary self-ascription, since it is a major and irreversible practice that
makes sense only from within a particular cultural membership. We
could also plausibly argue that the practice violates egalitarian reci-
procity, since it imposes significant costs on women that are not borne
by men and this violates the need for equal ‘civil, political, economic
and cultural rights’. The same could be said of arranged marriages,
‘marriages within prohibited degrees of relationships’30 and polygamy:
to the extent that these practices are involuntary, they violate freedom
of association and exit and the moral value of autonomy; to the extent
that they create or are founded on unequal rights, they violate egalita-
rian reciprocity. As for the most general controversy of culture – ‘the
subordinate status of women and all that entails’31 – there seems no
possible way that it could pass the tests of entry into the dialogical
process while remaining a controversy. It is surely structurally impossible
for anyone to argue in favour of women’s ‘subordinate status’ while
adhering to the norms of egalitarian reciprocity; ‘the most extensive
forms of self-ascription and self-identification possible’ within groups
for all individual members, including women; freedom of association
and exit; and the moral (as well as political) value of autonomy.
Benhabib herself seems to note this problem in passing, but dismisses its
significance. ‘Whether cultural groups can survive as distinct entities under
these conditions is an open question’, she notes with remarkable blunt-
ness. But she quickly adds: ‘I believe these conditions are necessary if legal
pluralism in liberal democratic states is to achieve the goals of cultural
diversity as well as democratic equality, without compromising the rights
of women and children of minority cultures.’32 She does not explain how
cultural diversity would survive the annihilation of cultural groups.
It seems, then, that the preconditions of discourse in Benhabib’s account
go a long way towards solving the main cultural dilemmas of gender
without requiring the intervention of dialogue. In general, we might say
that any meaningful prior stipulation of the values of equality and
29 Ibid., p. 106. 30 Ibid., p. 83. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., p. 20.
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autonomy will more or less rule out any non-liberal/feminist practices
or ethics of gender.33 This should not be surprising, since equality and
autonomy are, after all, both the founding values of liberalism and in
themselves extremely demanding.
We do not wish to suggest that there is no room for controversy on
matters of gender fromwithin a liberal perspective. There is, of course, a
great deal of controversy concerning an enormous number of gendered
practiceswithin liberal societies aswell as between liberal andnon-liberal
cultures. But it is important to distinguish two types of controversy. The
first builds on an acceptance that gender equality and autonomy for
women are crucial goals, and debates instead whether or not a particular
practice or policy violates these principles. Thus we can debate the extent
to which practices such as cosmetic surgery, housewifery or prostitution
are compatible with equality and autonomy. The problem with this sort
of debate is that it demonstrates that Benhabib’s preconditions are not
in themselves sufficiently determinate to be used as the sort of test she
has in mind. We are stuck in a vicious circle if our dialogue must be
constrained by the unquestionable principle of egalitarian reciprocity,
for example, but only through debate do we unearth what that principle
itself might mean. Which comes first, the principle or the dialogue estab-
lishing it? And if it is legitimate to use dialogue to establish the meaning
of the principle, why is it not also legitimate to leave the question of the
principle’s legitimacy to debate?34
33 A truly meaningful stipulation of equality and autonomy may also rule out in
advance several practices that are currently accepted in liberal societies. For
example, for a discussion of the philosophical similarities between cosmetic
surgery and female genital mutilation, despite the vast difference in the extent to
which western societies view the practices as acceptable, see Clare Chambers, Are
Breast Implants Better than Female Genital Mutilation? Autonomy, Gender
Equality andNussbaum’s Political Liberalism. inCritical Review of International
Social and Political Philosophy 7:4 (2004), pp. 1–33.
34 A similar problem confronts Young’s claim that what she terms ‘communicative
democracy’ must meet three conditions: ‘significant interdependence, formally
equal respect, and agreed-on procedures’. It is not clear why only the procedures
and not the conditions themselves must be agreed, or what to do if portions of the
polity oppose equal respect. Young is correct to claim that these ‘aremuch thinner
conditions that those of shared understandings or the goals of finding common
goods’, but they are nevertheless sufficiently thick to be controversial, particularly
when considering questions of gender. Iris M. Young, Communication and the
Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in Democracy and Difference:
Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton
University Press, 1996), pp. 126–7.
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The second sort of controversy concerning issues of gender does not
take place from an acceptance of the values of equality and autonomy,
but rather is based on a rejection of those principles in the context of
gender. In other words, practices such as the multicultural dilemmas
that Benhabib discusses may be justified from the point of view of a
cultural rejection of women’s equality and autonomy. It should be clear
that, while stipulating in advance that equality and autonomy are
non-negotiable underlying principles may give rise to a solution (indeed,
to the just solution), it does not do so through themechanism of dialogue.
Rather, gender ethics in this context are resolved by the assertion of
particular values regardless of cultural disagreement.
3 Private experience versus public reason: discursive
democracy and consciousness-raising
So far, we have argued that dialogue is not best suited to resolving issues
of gender, if it is used to develop foundational principles, for two
reasons. First, advocates of this use of dialogue tend to rely on regulative
principles which are themselves sufficiently substantive as to resolve
many issues of gender prior to dialogue. Second, without such regula-
tive principles there is no reason to suggest that dialogue would bring
about consensus or that, if consensus were reached, it would be egali-
tarian rather than discriminatory. Instead, we have argued that dialogue
necessarily presumes the value of equality and autonomy, and thus does
not provide a neutral basis for agreeing on those values.
The questionwhich arises from this argument is whether dialogue has
any role in issues of gender at all. We envisage two potential roles, but
shall explore only one of them. The first is that dialogue might play a
part in resolving questions of practical policy. For example, the values
of autonomy and equality demonstrate the need to enable women and
men to share paid and caring work. Members of a society might engage
in a debate as to which policies, such as childcare provision or working
hours’ legislation, are preferable. We shall say no more about this
potential role for dialogue here.35 Instead, we focus on another potential
35 For the argument that deliberative policy-making should take place only among
elected representatives and not among citizens, see Phil Parvin and
Declan McHugh, Defending Representative Democracy: Political Parties and the
Future of Political Engagement in the UK, Parliamentary Affairs 58:3 (2005),
pp. 632–55.
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role for dialogue in matters of gender: directly enhancing individuals’
autonomy by encouraging them to question and possibly revise their
understandings of, and assumptions about, the structures of society. This
alternative understanding of the role of dialogue draws on what Dryzek
terms ‘discursive democracy’ and on the second-wave feminist method of
consciousness-raising. These two approaches can usefully be compared:
despite Dryzek’s explicit criticism of consciousness-raising, the trans-
formative possibilities of this form of dialogue remain relevant to femi-
nist ethics.
InDeliberative Democracy and Beyond, Dryzek mourns the fact that
the term ‘deliberative democracy’ has replaced his preferred ‘discursive
democracy’. The latter term is preferable, he argues, for several reasons.
First, whereas deliberation can be done by an isolated individual, dis-
course is ‘necessarily social and intersubjective’ and thus must involve
communication.36 Second, whereas deliberative democrats have often
wanted to place limits on the sorts of dialogue deemed legitimate,
favouring only dispassionate and disinterested statements of principle
that have the potential to ground consensus, discursive interaction can
take many varied forms. In particular, discourse can encompass ‘unruly
and contentious communication from the margins’,37 thus better meet-
ing the aim of genuine inclusion. Third, the term ‘discursive democracy’
draws attention to discourse in the Foucauldian sense. For Dryzek,
discourses are not merely free expressions, as Habermas implies; rather,
they can also function as structural constraints on thought and discourse,
influencing people’s preferences as much as expressing them. Dryzek
emphasises the relevance of both the Habermasian and Foucauldian
models: discourses are not fully determining, but neither are they fully free.
Taken together, these three features of discourse form a conception of
deliberation that improves upon the liberal constitutionalist approaches
of theorists such as Rawls and Larmore by stating explicitly the impor-
tance of ‘non-political’ constraints upon our ability to act politically.
In other words, discursive democracy recognises one important contri-
bution of critical theory: the observation (proposed in section 1) that
individuals can be constrained by factors other than the coercive powers
of the state, and thus that there can be ‘extra-constitutional agents of
36 John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics,
Contestations (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. vi.
37 Ibid.
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distortion’,38 such as social norms. Such norms can inhibit certain peo-
ple’s entry into democratic debates and/or constrain the kinds of dialogue
and reasoning which seem possible or appropriate. Dryzek claims that
liberalism acts ‘only on the surface of the political economy’39 while
critical theory, and the discursive democracy that draws upon it, goes
deeper. This approach is particularly applicable to gender since much
gender inequality, particularly in liberal societies, is perpetuated not
through formal or legal restrictions but through internalised norms. A
complete ethics of gender, then, requires that unequal social norms are
addressed.
As it stands, the observation that individuals are constrained by
(gendered) social norms does not in itself justify the use of dialogue as
an emancipatory strategy. To move from critical theory to discursive
democracy, a further argument is needed. Specifically, discursive
democracy flows from the idea that individuals can be the source of
their own emancipation, and that they can do this most significantly and
effectively when acting in concert and through dialogue. In Dryzek’s
words, it must recognise ‘the competence of citizens themselves to reco-
gnize and oppose such forces, which can be promoted through partici-
pation in authentically democratic politics . . . democratic participation
can transform individuals’.40
Any reader familiar with feminist theory can hardly fail to recognise
the echoes of consciousness-raising in this argument. The consciousness-
raising group was a key feature of second-wave feminism – so funda-
mental that CatharineMacKinnon describes it as feminism’smethod.41 It
consisted of a group of people, usually women (though there were also
feminist consciousness-raising groups for men), who would meet regu-
larly to discuss issues of importance or concern in their lives. Crucially,
consciousness-raising groups operated on strict norms of equalitywithin
the group, with no hierarchical structure or leadership. Their aim was
to allow each member to talk about her own experiences and, through
interaction with the other members and their stories, to develop a more
critical understanding of those experiences. With this critical understan-
ding of experiences would come new perspectives on social structures,
particularly those relating to gender inequality. Ultimately, the aim was
38 Ibid., p. 21. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid., p. vi
41 Catharine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 83.
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transformative: through consciousness-raising, many women instigated
changes in their own lives, the lives of their families and their interaction
with society and the political structure.42
Consciousness-raising therefore shares key features of Dryzek’s discur-
sive democracy. First, both recognise individuals’ competence to recognise
and challenge even those social forces that constrain them.AsMacKinnon
puts it, in consciousness-raising, ‘[w]omen are presumed able to have
access to society and its structure because they live in it and have been
formed by it, not in spite of those facts’.43 By introspection, women can
critically examine the gendered norms that they have internalised and
which have become embodied in them. (As Diana Coole notes in this
volume, embodiment is a crucial part of dialogue specifically and politics
more generally.) For example, a woman engaged in consciousness-raising
might notice that she subconsciously tends to sit with her legs crossed
whereas men often have their legs apart. She might reflect that the explan-
ation for this is rooted within the different norms of decency and modesty
inculcated into children from a very young age, and develop this reflection
into amore generalised critique of sexism. In other words, a general social
theory can be developed by starting at the individual and personal level,
and change can be initiated from small-scale resistances. Consciousness-
raising thus shares discursive democracy’s faith in individuals’ ability to
transform society from the bottom up.
Second, both consciousness-raising and Dryzek’s discursive democ-
racy operate with a strongly egalitarian participatory framework. All
participants in a dialogue have the equal right to speak and to have their
concerns and views taken seriously. Indeed, feminists sometimes char-
acterised consciousness-raising in explicitly democratic terms.44 Thus,
whilst consciousness-raising as an abstract method can be used to
develop either egalitarian or reactionary consciousness, its founding
assumptions according to both feminist theory and the comprehensive
liberalism we defended in section 1 are profoundly progressive.
42 Susan Bruley,Women Awake: The Experience of Consciousness-Raising
(London: the author, 1976), p. 21; Kristin Henry andMarlene Derlet, Talking up
a Storm: Nine Women and Consciousness-Raising (Sydney, NSW: Hale &
Iremonger, 1993), p. 88.
43 MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State, p. 98.
44 Sheila Rowbotham,Women inMovement: Feminism and Social Action (London:
Routledge, 1992), p. 275.
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Third, like discursive democracy but unlike the liberal constitution-
alism that Dryzek criticises, consciousness-raising allows for a range
of communication. Indeed, in contrast to the Rawlsian bar on private
reason that is familiar or of interest to only the speaker, consciousness-
raising explicitly invites and values the expression of local, private,
particular experience. Rather than requiring that all communication
be framed in abstract, universal terms, consciousness-raising asserts
that ‘personal experience could reveal dynamically a social reality’45
and thus be relevant politically; hence ‘the personal is political’. Finally,
consciousness-raising is, like discursive democracy, inherently a collec-
tive activity. It cannot be done alone, but relies on dialogue between
individuals to further understanding and prompt self-reflection.46
Dryzek’s account of discursive democracy is therefore an account of
dialogue that seems immediately relevant to questions of gender, since it
strongly echoes second-wave feminist accounts. The idea here is that
dialogue does not serve to decide upon overarching normative princi-
ples such as equality or autonomy, in the way that political liberals and
many deliberative democrats appear to believe. Nor does dialogue
operate as a method for deciding upon controversial yet foundational
policy questions such as how extensively to protect gender equality, as
it does for Benhabib’s discourse ethics. Nor, finally, is it a method for
reaching group decisions on technical policy questions such as which
sorts of public services to provide, so as to replace traditional aggrega-
tive democracy. Instead, the dialogue of discursive democracy and the
consciousness-raising group focuses on enabling individuals to inves-
tigate and alter their own attitudes, preferences and understanding of
society, by sharing their own experiences and listening to the experi-
ences of others. It allows women and men critically to assess the role of
gender and to develop their own considered accounts of gender ethics
rather than uncritically adopting those that are prevalent in any given
society or culture.
Unfortunately, however, Dryzek is distinctly sniffy about the
consciousness-raising group and does not recognise either its transfor-
mative potential or its similarity to discursive democracy. (Another
contemporary (male) theorist who is dismissive of consciousness-raising
45 Ibid., p. 272.
46 Pamela Allen, The Small Group Process, in Radical Feminism: A Documentary
Reader, ed. Barbara A. Crow (New York University Press, 2000), p. 279.
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despite its relevance to his own approach is Pierre Bourdieu. As Diana
Coole notes in this volume, Bourdieu alerts us to the political and social
significance of our lived, embodied experience. Noticing and analysing
this significance was a fundamental insight and activity of consciousness-
raising. And yet Bourdieu, like Dryzek, fails to recognise this contri-
bution).47 One of Dryzek’s chapters is entitled ‘Difference Democracy:
The Consciousness-Raising Group against the Gentlemen’s Club’, but
rather than celebrate the merits of the former over the latter, he admo-
nishes ‘if [difference democrats] have replaced the gentlemen’s club only
with the consciousness-raising group, that is not good enough’.48
Dryzek’s main criticism of the consciousness-raising group is, rather
oddly, that it is coercive. Despite endorsing the legitimacy of a wide
variety of forms of communication, he insists that there must be some
limits. Specifically, discursive democracy can allow dialogue only if,
first, it neither coerces nor threatens coercion and, second, it connects
the particular to the general.49 Consciousness-raising violates one or
both of these conditions, according to Dryzek. He cites Young’s dis-
cussion of storytelling, the sort of communication he associates with the
consciousness-raising group, and warns:
There is a danger that such groups will require correct storylines, and punish
incorrect oneswhich cannot easilywithstand the normalizing gaze of the group.
The storyline must begin with oppression whose character is not recognized
by the victim, and proceed through recognition of the oppression to the search
for the need to contextualize that realization in more general framework.50
Dryzek’s warning does seem to reflect the experience of some
consciousness-raising groups.51 However, it would be too quick to con-
clude that because some groups can become dysfunctional then all groups
must be condemned, particularly when the dysfunction would be recog-
nised as such according to the principles of the consciousness-raising
and feminist movements. Indeed, the need to tell a convincing story is
not in fact part ofmany feminist understandings of consciousness-raising.
Rather, expressing one’s own personal, particular and disparate feelings
and dissatisfactions is emphasised, in stark contrast to the Rawlsian
need for ‘public reason’. It may be that a story emerges from within the
47 See Clare Chambers, Masculine Domination, Radical Feminism and Change,
Feminist Theory 6:3 (2005), pp. 325–46.
48 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, p. 75. 49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., p. 68. 51 Rowbotham,Women in Movement, p. 275.
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shared experiences of the group’s members as how to best understand
these feelings. This process, however, is one possible outcome of dialogue
and not the requirement for entry.
This understanding of the process of consciousness-raising, though
responding to Dryzek’s first worry, actually falls foul of his second test.
Despite criticising as ‘coercive’ the supposed requirement that an indi-
vidual’s communication conform to a particular generalised story,
Dryzek insists: ‘if an individual’s story is purely about that individual
then there is no political point in hearing it . . .The story must be capable
of resonating with individuals who do not share that situation – but do
share other characteristics (if only a common humanity)’.52 Dryzekmay
be right to say that there is no political point in a purely personal story,
but he is wrong to turn this observation into a test for participation
in dialogue. For it is in the nature of much experience, particularly
‘private’ gendered experience, that its generality and relevance is not
realised or understood until it is shared with others. Consider, for
example, the following comment from a woman who had been a
member of a consciousness-raising group:
None of them have been through what I’ve been through if you look at our
experience superficially. But when you look a little deeper – the way we’ve
been doing at these meetings – you see they’ve all been through what I’ve been
through, and they all feel pretty much the way I feel. God, when I saw that!
When I saw that what I always felt was my own personal hangup was as true
for every other woman in that room as it was for me! Well, that’s when my
consciousness was raised.53
In other words, consciousness-raising in particular, and the feminist
movement in general, alerts us to the political significance of private,
personal experience. (As Judith Squires notes in this volume, the political
does not exclude the expressive.) Whether a personal story has a general
point is something to be discovered through dialogue, not used to fore-
close it.
There are a number of ways that consciousness-raising could connect
with the democratic process. One possible option is that it could be
thought of as the precursor to more traditional democratic participa-
tion, in the sense that it is through consciousness-raising that some
52 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, p. 69.
53 Vivian Gornick, Consciousness, in Radical Feminism: A Documentary Reader,
ed. Barbara A. Crow (New York University Press, 2000), p. 289.
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individuals transcend entrenched discrimination and come to see them-
selves as equal political actors. It might also help participants come
to understand what they believe the state should do on their behalf, and
what policy outcomes they would support and argue for. However, it is
important to note that dialogue does not have to connect directly with
state institutions or formal democratic mechanisms in order to have
political significance.
4 Concluding remarks
We can now pull these threads together. Our first claim has been that
the dialogical process cannot be used to generate foundational moral or
ethical principles such as equality and autonomy. This is because such
foundational principles are usually stipulated as the basic requirements
for legitimate dialogue even to begin, and so it is question-begging to
attempt to derive them from that dialogue. On the other hand, dialogue
with no predetermined procedural conditions is capable at least in
principle of producing fundamental ethical principles, but in practice
it is highly likely that diversity and disagreement will bemore prominent
than consensus.
Our second conclusion is that, in matters of gender, the predeter-
mined procedural conditions themselves do a significant amount of the
normative work. To elaborate: where there is a controversy concerning
gender that derives from a clash between liberal and non-liberal cul-
tures, merely setting the ground rules that govern dialogue and its
outcomes will in itself be taking a stance on one side of the controversy.
On the other hand, if deliberation is supposed to occur only between
people who already concur on the basic liberal values of autonomy and
equality, then it will be unable to deal with many of the multicultural
dilemmas that are most fundamental to gender and that motivated the
deliberative turn in the first place. Deliberative democracy and political
liberalism therefore require cultural groups to respect women as equal
and autonomous political actors, regardless of the norms that prevail in
that community.
Third, though, there remains a role for dialogue in questions of gender:
to prompt critical reflection by individuals, interacting with each other,
on the way that gender affects their lives. The effects of this dialogue are
not merely internal. By reflecting on the gendered aspects of our own
experiencewe also gain the means to begin to change it. This change may
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be the result of our actions at the ballot box or in other state institutions,
but it may also be the result of changes we make in our own ‘private’
lives. Since gender is to a large extent internalised, a transformative
dialogue about gender is in itself a part of transforming gender itself.
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